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covering, was that in order to assure moments of superiority on
had to cultivate hopeless loves.
Vinnie said of her sister that "She fascinated everyone she saw
The flood of biographies which have followed Susan Dickinson's
obituary notice attest to the validity of that remark. But Vinni
also noted that it was Emily's job "to think." She added that Emil
was the only one of the Dickinsons "who had that to do." What
she thought about were the great questions facing all sensitive n
tures in the later half of the nineteenth century: historical Chri
tianity, our alienation from Nature, the limitations of knowing
our longing for love, the consolations of art. It is, I suppose, naiv
to think that Richard Sewall has had the last word on the subjec
of "the Myth." But until unknown documents come to light hi
study easily replaces all previous biographies.
FRANCIS MURPHY.

Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law. By David Wigdor. [Contribu
tions in American History, No. 33.] (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1974. Pp. xi, 356. $12.95-)

Scholars invariably treat Roscoe Pound as a major figure i

American legal and intellectual history, and yet they often discu

only a handful of his essays written in the half dozen years between

19o6 and 1912. That seems anomalous for someone who live

ninety-four years, wrote literally millions of words, and for almost

half a century enjoyed a reputation as the most distinguished leg
philosopher in America. One of the merits of David Wigdor's b
ography is to justify that anomalous treatment.
Wigdor argues that Pound's creative work was limited by both

his social-professional attitudes and his intellectual confusio

While the sociological and empirical thrust of his early essays co
tained progressive implications, Pound himself had only partia
sympathy with the currents of political reform. His main concerns

were to defend the common law tradition, to improve the existin
legal system with minor procedural reforms, and to further pr
fessionalize and exalt the work of lawyers and judges. "Mechanic
jurisprudence" was an evil primarily because it represented inefficient technique and brought the legal profession under unnecessary criticism. Additionally, Wigdor seems to imply, "Me
chanical Jurisprudence" was a useful concept for an essentially
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conservative set of values-it implied that
courts were involved in stemmed from f

than from class bias. For Pound, then, true reform narrowed to a

modification of judicial technique carried out by legal experts.
Traditionalism and professionalism, by constantly placing what
were essentially status-quo oriented ideological limits on his work,
soon robbed it of its innovative, dynamic qualities.
More broadly, Wigdor attributes the severe limitations of both
Pound's political progressivism and his systematic jurisprudence
to his "organicism." From his devotion to the common law, from
late nineteenth-century sociology, from his training in botany,
and from his own traditionalism, Pound came to conceive of so-

ciety as an integrated organism-all parts mutually interrelated,
self-contained, essentially unified, and progressively developing by
stages toward a natural perfection. When that deeply held organicism confronted progressivism and instrumentalism in the years
after 1900oo, the friction sparked Pound's period of greatest creativ-

ity. The attempt to graft instrumentalism onto organicism, however, also created a "crippling dualism" which "confined his ma-

ture jurisprudence to a collection of brilliant but inconclusive
insights" (285). Instrumentalism disguised his organicism, and organicism distorted his instrumentalism; hence Pound's work after
1920o never fulfilled the promise of the earlier essays. Wigdor con-

cludes, Pound more and more sought recourse in administrative
responsibilities and increasingly ponderous historical summaries.
The emphasis on traditionalism and professionalism is apt, providing a needed corrective to Pound's continuing reputation as a
"progressive." The discussion of his theoretical confusion is provocative but less convincing. The author seems to assume that
there is some necessary connection between philosophical "instrumentalism" and political "progressivism," between method and
ideals. He suggests that Pound was forced to "compromise the instrumentalist features of his thought" because fundamentally he
"wanted to implement only those reforms that promoted one of
his larger loyalties"-that is, traditionalism, professionalism, and
organicism (209). And yet "larger loyalties," rather than being external forces of perversion, are intrinsic parts of any "instrumental-

ism." Pound may have been guilty of "compromise" in the minds
of his pragmatic-progressive contemporaries, but his guilt is not
so clear in light of either the continuing challenges of theoretical
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jurisprudence or subsequent discoveries about the confusions in
pragmatic-progressivism itself. In other words, that Pound's min
was plagued by an unresolvable theoretical confusion may well b
true, but that the confusion was rooted in the necessary logical im-

plications of two contradictory world views, "instrumentalism"
and "organicism," seems unlikely and misleading.
Wigdor concentrates on Pound's early years, telescoping the
last half of his life into two of the eleven chapters. The result i
an interpretative, rather than a comprehensive, biography. Its
strengths are a clear focus, easy readability, and an insightful over-

all evaluation of its subject. The author provides an extended discussion of Pound's formative years in Nebraska and, in one of th
most thoughtful sections of the book, illuminates the nature of his

work as a botanist and its relationship to his later jurisprudence
Such a concise biography necessarily has gaps. Pound's personal
life, and its connection with his public career, are touched on onl
briefly. The nature of his special guru-like function within th
legal profession, especially in the later years, is merely suggested
Finally, his elaborate and formal work in jurisprudence is largely
ignored. The whole book is essentially an argument to justify tha

exclusion, of course, and it is largely valid. Still, a chapter o
Pound's systematic jurisprudence would have been useful to the
general reader, and it could also have strengthened the author's

thesis.

Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law is a thoughtful, perceptive
synthesis that leads the reader constantly to confront the questions

of the significance and nature of Roscoe Pound's work. It wi
quickly and deservedly become a standard source, not only for
Pound's career, but also for American legal and intellectual histor
in the twentieth century.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.

The American Revolution of i8oo. By Daniel Sisson. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf. 1974. Pp. xiii, 468. $12.50.)

Thomas Jefferson meant exactly what he said. The "Revolution
of 18oo," which won him the presidency, was ". . as real a revolu
tion in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in i
form." The election of 18oo, says Daniel Sisson, launched yet an
other cycle of the continuing revolution in which Jefferson so pas-

This content downloaded from 149.10.125.20 on Tue, 26 Feb 2019 01:49:01 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

